Suchergebnisse

Decreasing returns at the macro level are an outcome of efficiency at the micro level. When inputs are scarce, an efficient economy carries out only the most productive projects; when inputs are abundant, the economy implements less productive projects as well. This link between decreasing returns and efficiency suggests that misallocation can reduce the extent of aggregate decreasing returns. I formalize this connection and establish two main results: (i) misallocation amplifies the volatility of output with respect to fluctuations in inputs; and (ii) financial integration amplifies shocks in relatively distorted economies, but mitigates them in less distorted economies. (JEL D24, D82, E23, E32, E44, F41)

This paper asks whether there are welfare gains from additional redistribution. First, it derives a sufficient condition for the existence of welfare gains from a small increase in lump-sum transfers financed by a uniform increase in labor income taxes. A calibration suggests that, even under very conservative assumptions, most countries would benefit from such a scheme. Second, it asks whether, given existing tax revenues, there are gains from diverting public funds from government investment projects toward redistributive programs. The analysis suggests that the answer is highly sensitive to parameter values and the rate of return on government investment.

Is a five-day workweek followed by a two-day weekend a socially optimal schedule? This paper presents a model in which labor productivity and the marginal utility of leisure evolve endogenously over the workweek. Labor productivity is shaped by two forces: restfulness, which decreases over the workweek, and memory, which improves over the workweek. The structural parameters of the model are disciplined using daily variation in electricity usage per worker. The results suggest that increases in the ratio of vacation to workdays lead to output losses. A calibration of the model suggests that a 2-3 day workweek followed by a 1 day weekend can increase welfare.

This paper studies the possibility of using financial regulation that prohibits the use of money substitutes as a tool for mitigating the adverse effects of deviations from the Friedman rule. When inflation is not too high regulation aimed at eliminating money substitutes improves welfare by economizing on transaction costs. The gains from regulation depend on the distribution of income and the level of direct taxation. The area under the demand for money curve is equal to the welfare cost of inflation only when there are no direct taxes and no proportional intermediation cost: otherwise, the area under the demand curve overstates the welfare cost of inflation when money substitutes are not important and understates the welfare cost when money substitutes are important.